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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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
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STALEMATE IN PEKING IRRITATES MOSCOW

The Peking talks are entering their sixth month with no signs of progress. Moscow, seeing no hope for improvement, is evidencing impatience with the stalemate. A TASS statement on 14 March put on record Moscow's denial of "imperialist" rumors that the Soviet Union is engaged in "major military activities" in preparation for an attack on China. Though the statement appears designed to refute Chinese charges that the Soviets are forcing them to negotiate under military pressure, it backhandedly serves to remind Peking that Moscow retains a military option despite its commitment to a political settlement.

Peking, by contrast, has maintained a comparatively low-keyed political posture in recent weeks, presumably in order to counter Moscow's charges of Chinese intransigence and to avoid giving the Soviets a pretext for downgrading or suspending the talks. In addition, recent indicators point to some Chinese uneasiness over possible developments if the border talks collapse. Last week, for instance, a Chinese broadcast highlighted in unusually grim detail the "present danger" of nuclear war, and recently, Chinese officials abroad have increased efforts to get information on Soviet military strength and intentions along the border.

theless, the TASS statement aid not disavow them and Soviet propaganda claiming that its border forces are in a state of "constant readiness" indicates that Moscow remains unhappy with the unsettled situation on the frontier.

Recent movements in Sino-US relations have irked the Soviets, who have charged the Chinese with attempting to use the Warsaw talks to gain "an upper hand" in the Peking negotiations. Although the Soviets probably think an immediate Sino-US rapprochement unlikely, they clearly resent Peking's successful efforts to break out of its diplomatic isolation.

Despite the misgivings, the Soviets publicly and privately stress their intention to continue the talks. They are communicating their side of the dispute to other Communist parties and have apparently pressed their East European allies to engage in a unified anti-Chinese propaganda campaign. Private Soviet statements attesting to patience in the face of alleged Chinese provocation may be an effort, however, to lay the groundwork for eventual adoption of a less restrained policy toward China.